On that day, however, I did not feel at all like reading; only on the next did I begin. As usual, I skimmed through the book, skipping the pages which did not catch my attention, before I settled down to a more careful reading.
From this superficial glance I was able to see that Bung Karno had not told the en tire truth. He had put forward as facts things he had only made up, and he had exaggerated in places.
Indeed, he had gone so far as to distort facts, one of which deeply disturbed me.
In Chapter 22, "What Price Freedom," Bung Karno unashamedly stated that he completed his working program by setting up the PETA;1 and elsewhere he said that he had proposed me, Gatot Mangkupradja, to the Japanese to start the PETA.
Frankly speak ing, I was deeply hurt by this unreasonable claim.
I had re garded Bung Karno as a great man, and it was unbelievable to me * 1 * As readers may be unfamiliar with the period of Indonesia's history described in this account, the editors have supplied footnotes explaining some of the terms used and incidents referred to.
1. Sukarno actually says that the setting up of the PETA com pleted the second part of his working program, i.e., the arming of the people (p. 186).
that he should have been so extraordinarily selfish as to claim for his own what others had done. I do not mean to boast. Far from it. Nor do I want praise and honor.
I do not want to be called a leader or a hero; I would rather have had no mention whatever of my name and of PETA in Indonesia^ history. But I do not want anyone else to claim as his own work what I myself did, not even if that person were a general or a commander-inchief or a president or a king. The proposal to set up a volunteer "Fatherland Defence Corps" and a "Hizbullah Corps" was one I made to the Japanese military regime through its general staff, the Sambo Beppan,2 and I staked my life on its success.
I did this because I did not wish to see conscription introduced into Indonesia, as had been proposed by the Djawa Hokokai,3 which, under the leadership of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta, had sent in a petition to that effect to General Harada.4
It is only in order to counter the distortion of historical fact regarding the Fatherland Defence Corps that I resolved to write this correction.
I write it not to degrade Bung Karno, but to place the historical facts in their proper perspective.
My humble greetings to the Reader, Gatot Mangkupradja
Bandung, 20 April 1967.
The Independence Movement
I was born in Sumedang on December 15, 1898. My father was a very well-known doctor in the Priangan, Raden Mohamad Saleh Mangkupradja. At the time of my birth he was fulfilling his contract as government doctor for the civilian and military population; after completing his service in 1910 he practiced medicine in Bandung. He became famous because, in addition to using pharmaceutical medicines and drugs in his practice, he also employed materials derived from herbs growing in Indonesia.
Sambo Beppan, better known as the Beppan, was the Special
Task Unit within the 16th Army HQ which was responsible for counter-intelligence and special operations. It was headed until July 1945 by Lieutenant-Colonel Masugi.
3. Djawa Hokokai was the last and most effective of the mass organizations instituted by the Japanese for the mobiliza tion of the population of Java behind the war effort. It was set up in March 1944.
He made experiments and left behind a good many recipes, which I have kept until now. He earned so much money as a doctor that he was able to buy houses, ricefields, and other real estate; he even ran a long-distance taxi service which estab lished connections with the railway line that ran between Tandjung Sari, Tjirebon, and Kadipaten.
On his death, my father left a large estate, which was divided among his six children.
In 1905 I began a Dutch-style primary education (Europeesche Lagere School) in Bandung.
I finished in 1913, and the same year I began my studies at the school for Indonesian doctors (STOVIA) at Weltevreden, now a part of Djakarta.
Once there I became a leader in the Langen Siswa Weltevreden and also joined in set ting up the Pagujuban Pasundan, together with other Sundanese STOVIA students, among them Kusumah Sudjana, Djundjunan, Slamet, Hidajat, Kusma, Daeng Ardiwinata, and E. Purawinata.
I left the STOVIA at the third form, and in 1917 began to study at the senior high school (HBS) in Bandung. There I was active in the Bond Inheemsche Studeerenden, under the leadership of Brother Wiwoho. This group united student organizations of the OSVIA (school for Indonesian administrators), Kweekschools (teacher training schools), and the HBS; it fused into Jong Java in 1920.
I pursued my HBS studies also to the third form, and in 1922 I began to work in the railway service under the admin istration of Ir. F. Querin den Hollander, a very kind and prudent engineer, who was extremely nice to me. I might point out here that the picture Bung Karno gives in his autobiography of relations between the Dutch and Indonesians seems to me much exaggerated. He said, for example, that Dutch children liked to spit at him. This is unlikely: the Europeans disapproved very much of spitting, and when any of us schoolchildren spat, the others would say "Foei" (Fie!). Moreover, he is not right in saying that Dutch pupils did not have to pay school fees; all school-children did, both Indonesians and Dutch, unless they were considered ' 'badly off." Bung Karno also claimed that he had once proposed to marry the daughter of a Dutchman, Mr. Hessels, who not only dismissed him rudely but also insulted him. I think this story was made up by Bung Karno to indulge his hatred of the nation which once dominated Indonesia. How could a boy still studying at HBS ask for a lady's hand? If he did so, as he described, one would not blame Mr. Hessels for being angry. A young woman is not merchandise; the parents should first be well acquainted with their future son-in-law.
Especially among the Europeans or Eurasians there must first be a period of engagement, and this only after the parents of the two parties have approved of it. The proposal of marriage should be preceded by the parents' agreement and then should be made in a formal way and not like buying something from a store. Bung Karno's statement only shows he did not know etiquette, and Mr. Hessels' response most probably was:
"Zeg, jongeman, wie ben je?" Wie zijn je ouders? Ken je geen manieren? Er uit-ga uit mijn oogen, voor er wat gebeurtonbeschofte kerel." (I say, young man, who are you? Who are your parents? Don't you know your manners? Get out-out of my sight, before something happens-impudent rascal.!t) Bung Karno also said that Dutch youngsters did not pay the least attention to their Indonesian classmates, and when they did it was only to speak rudely to them. This is not true. I myself associated with boys and girls of both Dutch-Indonesian and full Dutch blood, and we all got along well together. I remember that around 1921, after I had left the HBS in Bandung, several Dutch friends of mine who had continued their studies at the Technical School (now the Bandung Institute of Technology) wanted to visit the sugar factory in Kadipaten together with their professors.
Some students came to my house and asked me to join them, as they knew that I had my own car; and of course I went with these future engineers to Kadipaten.
In 1927 I met a former classmate, Haga, who had sat at the same desk in school with me; he had become head of a Residency in Central Java.
I also met up again with an old friend, Frits James, who had become the manager of a sugar factory at Djatipiring. I fll mention, too,Ir. Bosman, president-director of BPM, who warmly received me at his house at Gambir S H -in 1953 , eight years after the proclamation of Indonesian independence; he still regarded me in the same friendly way he used to. I had the same cordial relations with Dalmeyer from the BPM, who is now living in The Hague. There were many among the Dutch who gave support to the Indonesian struggle for independence: I could name Meyer, Sleebos, Chateline, Ir. Wiedenhoff, De la Fosse, Everts, Jhr. van der Goest, and Koperberg, all of whom held important posi tions .
In the railway service, I worked as a senior clerk.
I be longed to the railroad workers' union, VSTP, which the Communist leader Semaun headed.
The trouble in 1923 which Bung Karno mentions as receiving so much attention in the newspapers was not, incidentally, Hadji Hassan's incident in Garut as he says, but the VSTP strike that took place that year. The police were busy searching for Semaun in Garut, as he had been living in that town, namely on Djalan Pangampaan in the house of my uncle, who worked as a teacher of signals in the railway service in Bandung at that time. After the strike I was moved to Djakarta, where I worked for the railroad inspectorate. There are a number of things which Bung Karno has claimed regarding the development of the nationalist movement which I believe are not true.
For example, he says that one day in 1922, when he was still a student at the Bandung Technical School, he cut his classes and went south of Bandung, where he met with a peasant. The peasant's name was Marhaen, and it was from his conversation with this man that Bung Karno got the idea of "Marhaenism., T This is not so. The term "Marhaen" was coined by Sukarno in 1928 after the establishment of the PNI. At first the term Kromo had been much in vogue to refer to the common man; for women the term was Kasinem. Marhaenism was used specifically to distinguish between proletarianism, which is based on class struggle as taught by Marx, and the union of people of different classes fighting against colo nialism, as this was experienced in Indonesia.
It meant the union of the whole nation, which is broader than just the union of the proletariat. The term "Marhaenism" only became popular, then, after 1928.
Bung Karno is also wrong in saying that one could not mention the name "Indonesia" or encourage others to do so. There was no penalty attached to the use of that name. How ever, after the establishment of the Indonesian Party (Partindo), when Amir Sjarifuddin struck up the slogan "Indonesia Merdeka--Sekarang" (Indonesia Free, Now!) the word "merdeka," free, was prohibited. That was after the 1932 Partindo congress at Gang Kenari in Djakarta. Again, Bung Karno said that he used the term "Guided Nationalism" in 1926. Actually, up to 1929, he used the term "Positive Nationalism," and after the establishment of the Partindo he used "SocioNationalism and Socio-Democracy," the term "socio-"having been taken from the ideas expressed by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro at the Taman Siswa congress in Jogjakarta.
Bung Karno also said that he had suggested uniforms for the nationalists. This, too, is not so. Indeed, he denounced the wearing of uniforms as resembling the practice of the Balilla troops of fascist Italy and the Hitler Jugend of Nazi Germany. Uniforms were worn by the Surya Wirawan forma tion of the Parindra, the JOP of Pasundan, and by the youth of the A1 Itihadiatul Islamiah in Sukabumi.
On October 29, 1928, Bung Karno said, he officially in stituted the slogan "One Nation, One Country, One Language." In fact, the slogan was struck up by representatives at the congress of Indonesia Muda that year, led by Mohamad Yamin, Amir Sjarifuddin, Asaat Datuk Muda, Anta Permana, Yusuf Adi, Sukiman, A. K. Gani, and others. We of the adult group mere ly witnessed this and endorsed the slogan. The national anthem, "Indonesia Raya," was also introduced then, with some last-minute alterations. Just before the congress Rudolf Wage Supratman, the composer, and Mr. Sujudi (an enthusias tic piano-player; Supratman, like Sartono, played the violin) changed the 4/4 measure into 3/4 and later into 1/2. They also used the words "Indonesia Raja Merdeka Merdeka" instead of the original "Indonesia Raja--Indoja, Indoja." Bung Karno says that he was the popularizer of the petji. Well, well!--hadnTt there been such a cap before Bung Karno wore it? The black velvet caps had been brought over by Malays via Padang and Palembang.
First they became popular in the area of Djakarta and later in the interior, especially West Java, where by 1905 men had begun to have their hair cut and to wear the petji, which was also called the koptjah or kopiah.
In Bandung, as far as I can remember, the wearing of this Malay cap was pioneered by the families of Tjik Hadji Abdul Sjukur, Tjik Hadji Adjis, and Hadji Anang Tajib, all wealthy jewel merchants. Afterwards the cap became popular among young men who were earning their living as traders and among the hadjis in the town of Bandung. Some corrections should also be made in the description of the PNI organization by Bung Karno. He said, for one thing, that Bandung was divided into several organizational sectors. That is not correct: the city and regency of Bandung formed one branch (tjabang).
Below this were the sector (sektor), on the ketjamaton level, the local (ressort), equivalent to the village (desa), and finally the block (blok) or segment of the local.
Bung Karno claimed, in describing his activities in the PNI, that he often had to hold important secret talks in the back of an automobile. This is a fiction; although each of us was continually followed by two detectives and our houses were watched by police agents, there was no reason to hold conversations in the back of cars; it was perfectly possible to meet at home or in the office.
It is also certainly not true, as Bung Karno claimed, that the PNI used a brothel for meetings and that in Bandung it had 670 members who were whores. The fact is that one or two reformed prostitutes who had married joined the PNI together with their husbands. We were most cautious about admitting prostitutes and gamb lers , who might endanger the organization by giving it a bad name. Every member, man or woman, was screened, and as PNI secretary I always gave orders to the party commissioners to be very careful in their acceptance of candidate members. Before admitting a person as a full member, he had to be a candidate for three months. Then he would be voted on after Aguinaldo from the Philippines.
I got the impression that the Japanese were seriously determined to see that Asia is for the Asians, and after my return to Indonesia I immediately made contact with the Japanese running shops in Bandung, Jogja, and Solo, and managing plantations in Garut and Tjiandjur.
The prospect of a Pacific War had always been used by the PNI as something to excite people at mass meetings; it was taken from an English magazine-if I am not mistaken the London News--which contained a book review of a work by an English admiral. In his book, the English admiral had guessed there would be an outbreak of war in the Pacific because of the struggle for power between Japan and the USA.
In 1932 the Japanese had made a motion picture which showed the progress of their armed forces; it was preceded by a cartoon which showed an arm stretching out to grip Asia and this arm being shot away by a cannon from a warship flying the Japanese flag, the flag of the rising sun.
Although I did not take an active part in political organi zations when I returned, I was often seen visiting Japanese shops, and I therefore did not escape from the eyes of the political police.
Often enough the police agents, among others Mr. Djanakum, Mr. Rachmat, and Mr. Sambas, would come to my store not only to buy medicine but to ask for my personal views on Japan.
In order to avoid unnecessary trouble I made up my mind to move to some other town, and my choice fell on Tjiandjur, where I opened a pharmacy, the Indische Kruidenhandel "De Erven van Dr. Saleh! T (Indies Herb Shop "The Heirs of Dr. Saleh").
I also established branches in Sukabumi, Purwakarta, and Bandung. In 1935 I moved my family to Tjiandjur. We lived there at Bihbul in the desa of Nagrak, which was located in the middle of the ricefields about three kilometers from town. I had to live in the country, for the medicinal ingredients I dealt in had to be dried in the sun and then pounded.
In town there was no yard large enough for drying the herbs while in the country side, among the ricefields, there was ample room for this. I also made the acquaintance in this period of Mr. Takeomi Togashi, a Japanese storekeeper whose shop was situated next to mine on Djalan Raya, Tjiandjur. I was to have many acquaintances among the Japanese military, for a good deal of the Japanese who opened shops in Java were actually military personnel.
In 1942 the Pacific War broke out, and in March of that year the Japanese army landed in Java.
One day we learned that the Japanese forces had entered Tjibeureum; the Dutch troops stationed at Tjirandjang and the British under General Shilling had retreated as far as Bandung. All of a sudden, several friends of mine came round and asked me to go to the Regent of Tjiandjur, as some Japanese officers disguised in Indonesian clothes had arrived at his place, among them my neighbor Mr. Togashi.
On my arrival at the RegentTs residence I met Mr. Togashi, who introduced me to Lieutenant Yanagawa and to Captain Nagata, who was leading the Japanese troops together with Captain Shigeno. Then and there, in front of many people, Mr. Togashi said, 1 1 Well, Mr. Gatot, before very long Indonesia will surely be free. Now, however, we are still at war; I hope you are prepared to help us." All who heard this became excited and cried, "Hidup, hidup! Merdeka, merdeka!" (Hooray, hooray! Liberty, liberty!), and shortly after that the people brought out Red-and-White flags, which they hung everywhere.
Mr. Togashi told me that he was going to Bandung straight away and that if I wanted to see him again I must come to the Concordia building in that city.
Several days later, Brother Winoto came to me from Sukabumi and asked me to accompany him to Bandung. As I had been given a surat djalan (a letter or document issued to a person by the local military authority giving him permission to travel), by Captain Nagata* I went to Bandung by car together with Brother Winoto and several young men in order to meet Mr. Togashi and Mr. Yanagawa at the Concordia.
That afternoon Mr. Togashi invited me to his home on Djalan Wastukentjana (the mansion later occupied by the Siliwangi Division commander Ibrahim Adjie).
In that house I was* intro duced to several more Japanese officers.
In the evening after dinner I was brought in a car to Djalan Embong 17. This had been my home before I moved to Tjiandjur, and it was now occupied by my younger brother, Raden Gunawan, who worked for the radio, post, and*telegraph service.
The next day I returned to Tjiandjur. All of us had gotten surat djalan from Mr. Yanagawa, and at Tjiandjur I asked a Chinese to tell me what mine said, as it was written in Kanji. The man, whose name was Wong Yun Kong, told me that it was a very important paper, for with it I* could go anywhere without being anxious about being detained by Japanese soldiers. From its* seal it was evident* that the officer who signed it was from the Sambo Beppan, a body which was more authoritative than the Kempeitai. In Tjiandjur, however, the Putera could not get under way, for after the dispersal of the AAA no one there would join any movement at all. I had already asked Mr. Yanagawa for information about the Putera, and he ad vised me not to join it. This seems odd, as it had been in spired by Beppan officers. However, the Shimizu group from the Gunseikanbu (Civil Administration) supported it and many from the Gunsireikanbu (Military Administration) group did not.7 On 6. The AAA or Triple-A was the first of the "mass" organizations set up by the Japanese on the island of Java. I found the plan in conflict with the teachings and views of the Indonesian Nationalist Party on conscription.
It was formed in
In the colonial period Bung Karno himself, while leading the PNI in Bandung, had argued against conscription on the grounds that: (1) conscription is something forced upon a subject people; (2) for an independent state, conscription is obviously beneficial, as it provides forces which can fight for the sake of the country; (3) for a subject people, military service means supporting and reinforcing the position of the colonialists; (4) even though the young man is unwilling and his father forbids it, a conscript must join the army, and if he refuses he may be sentenced to two long years; and (5) conscript soldiers are under the regular army and may be sent abroad, away from their native land.
We discussed the matter among ourselves, and finally I de cided that it would be much better to suggest a system of volun tary military service, even though the fate of the young men who 8. The Keibitai were actually Garrison Guards. entered it might be no better than if they had been conscripted. At least those who did not wish to enter would not be compelled to do so, and likewise, if parents were unwilling, their sons would not be taken away.
For this reason I wrote a letter the next day to Mr. Raden Bratanata, the editor of Tjahaja, asking him to print my views objecting to the introduction of conscrip tion in the light of the fact that volunteer forces would be much more suitable for Indonesia.
I wrote only briefly, with out elaboration.
The very next day after my letter was published, a soldier from the Sukabumi Kempeitai came to my house and asked me to accompany him to Sukabumi; there I was brought to the Kempeitai office and detained. As the Kempeitaicho9 and some of his sub ordinate officers knew that I had had much to do with SambU Beppan officers, I was not treated rudely.
On the contrary, I was even quartered in the house of Sergeant Kobayashi. After several days I was interrogated by the Kempeitaichu, Mr. Ichizaki, with Mrs. Milbraadt Miller acting as interpreter. Among other things, he asked if I had written anything in the Tjahaja and whether I was unwilling to support Nippon or perhaps was even opposed to Nippon.
I told him that I wanted to support Nippon and was not in the least against Nippon.
I only preferred a volunteer corps, since during a war only very brave young men joined armies of their own free will.
I then told him that after the war in Europe had broken out in 1939, the Netherlands East Indies administration had set up various forces in Java:
(1) a territorial militia (Landwacht); (2) a city militia (Stadswacht); (3) a volunteer train ing corps (Vrijwilliger Oefencorps, VOC); (4) a corps of reserve officers (Korps Reserve-Officieren, KORO); (5) an emergency mili tary academy; (6) an air raid alert service (Luchtbeschermingsdienst); (7) air raid protection organizations for rural areas, run by the civil administration and police; and (8) a system of conscription (militieplicht). I myself, I said, had been appointed deputy head of the air raid protection organization in the town of Tjiandjur under the leadership of Mr. Lodens. Its central office had been headed by Mr. van der Wetering. I said that all of this had been forced on the Indonesians by the Dutch. Thus, when the Japanese soldiers landed on Java our peo ple had everywhere thrown away their guns and uniforms and headed back to their villages. Together with the assistant wedana of Tjugenang and Tjikalong, I had collected the carbines which they had thrown away in the tea plantations at Kiarapajung, Tjimatis, and Tjugenang. That was the reason why I had asked for volunteers and not for conscripts.
The Kempeitaicho nodded 9. Kempeitaichcr--chief of the local branch of the Kempeitai. It should be noted that the Kempeitai and the Beppan formed sepa rate hierarchies within the military, often in rivalry with one another. musingly and then made a telephone call, to whom I do not know.
Early in the afternoon I was taken back home to Tjiandjur. There I was surrounded by many friends and neighbors, who asked me how I felt. They all thought I had been tortured.
I also learned that after I had been taken away to Sukabumi my wife had immediately gone to Bandung and visited Mr. Togashi to ask his help. The next day I received a telephone call from Regent R. A. Abbas Surianata Atmadja, saying that I was asked to go to Djakarta to meet Mr. M. Yanagawa at his office.
That very day I said goodbye to my wife and set off for Djakarta.
I went to stay at the house of Mr. R. Mohammad Jasin, chief of the Djakarta police, who lived at Djalan Kramat 11. The following day I went to the Beppan office at Gambir 64, where I found Mr. Yanagawa and other Japanese officers already waiting for me. They brought me to Major-General Sato, the chief of staff, who was meeting with some of his officers. Major-General Sato asked me the same questions that had been posed by the KempeitaichO' at Sukabumi, and I gave the same answers. He then asked me whether I would be prepared to re ceive my punishment, if no one was willing to join the volun teer forces.
On leaving home I had determined to bear all the consequences of my stand, as I wanted to see Indonesian youths saved from com pulsory induction into the army.
If they became victims of their own free will it was a different matter. At that time I only wanted to prevent coercion. After a lengthy interrogation, I was finally allowed to return to the home of Mr. Mohammad Jasin, but was told to present myself again at the office the next day. I was taken home in a car by Mr. Nagashima, a junior officer who was already very good at Indonesian.
On the way he confided to me that Lieutenant Yanagawa was very much in agreement with the formation of a volunteer force as I proposed, but that several officers were still doubtful. I did not attach importance to this at the time. However, one day Mr. Yanagawa elaborately explained to me that he was seriously interested in the Indonesians1 desire for national independence and that he was prepared to lend his support to it. We then began to talk about the Indonesian independence movement.
I told him that I had once been to Japan and had joined in the Pan-Asiatic Congress in Tokyo.
I also told him that I had acquaintances among the circles of the PanAsiatic movement.
Mr. Yanagawa frankly and openly explained that not all Japanese were of one opinion on the matter, but he himself wanted very much to help. He said that in order to achieve their desire for national independence, the Indonesian people had first of all to be made strong and possess a great, flaming spirit.
Since Mr. Yanagawa could not speak Indonesian well, it was very difficult for him to explain what he felt; but I was able to see that he greatly regretted the fact that among the Indone sians there were many who were weak and poor-spirited with little "seizin." They had to be aroused.
Mr. Yanagawa also explained that Indonesia had to possess a strong army of her own. For me, this statement of his was most unclear. How could Indonesia acquire her own army, when she had been under the domination of a foreign power so long? Those who did become soldiers had always served as subordinates, and power remained in the hands of those who ruled.
One day Mr. Narusawa came to Tjiandjur and asked me to help him look for some young men who were willing and able to undergo military instruction in Bandung.
I promised to do so, and from several ketjamatan I sent a number of young men to Bandung for basic training at Djalan Merdeka.
I Frankly, I must confess that as, a soldier, Mr. Yanagawa was more far-seeing than I was in welcoming and later in serving the cause of Indonesian independence and nationhood.
I gave too much emphasis to the strength of masses, relying on their flaming spirit and zeal to carry out the independence struggle, while Yanagawa, in addition to the strength of the masses, relied on creating a core force of steeled discipline and skill in matters of war, which could produce, maintain, and develop Independence. This core force was to be the "pushing power" which would bring forth leadership and undying zeal. This idea became a reality during our struggle against the Dutch. Without this core force, Leader and Provider of a Steeled Spirit, the civilians could not have prevailed against the Dutch.
It was thanks to the endurance of the Armed Forces that the Dutch were finally forced to trans fer sovereignty to the Indonesian people. And this has to be recognized by the Indonesian politicians. I told him that I had received various let ters and postcards from people who were ready and willing to join the corps. Mr. Supangkat, who said he had already read all about it in Indonesia Raya, suggested that I submit another proposal urging that the volunteer troops later become an Army of National Defense that would fight within the borders of Indonesia.
I therefore asked him to prepare that supplementary letter of petition, which he wrote in English.
In the letter we pleaded that the volunteer corps should be a Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland, which could later become Indonesia1s National Army.
Carrying this supplementary letter of petition, I went to the Beppan office at Gambir 64 to find Mr. Yanagawa, who hap pened to be there with Captain I-ie, and I handed him the letter. From the Beppan office I went to the Karuhun pharmacy at Kramat to meet my friend Johan Diponegoro, who warmly welcomed me. With Johan was another friend of mine, Surjadi, the commander of the Djakarta branch of the Indonesian National Scout movement (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, KBI) and the head of the KORA ad vertising bureau. The three of us agreed to agitate for the volunteer army. The next day I introduced these two friends of mine to Mr. Yanagawa, and for the purpose of our campaign we asked for a letter of testimonial, which Mr. Yanagawa immediately prepared for us.
Through the newspapers we informed people that those who wished to enlist in the Volunteer Army should send in their let ters of application to Djalan Kramat 11, Djakarta.
Letters of support came from all over. Every week these letters were col lected and brought to the Beppan office as "proof" that my pro posal had received the enthusiastic support of many people.
About the beginning of October 1943 I received a summons, brought by Mr. Nagashima and Mr. Abdulhamid Ono, which said that my proposal on the formation of the volunteer defense army had been accepted and that I was to present myself at the Beppan office in order to meet General Harada and the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto, to be congratulated. At the General Staff office I heard that Bung Karno would automatically agree and that he would be summoned for this purpose by General Harada. Several days afterwards, I saw in the newspapers the picture of Bung Karno before General Harada, and a report that Bung Karno had agreed to the proposal and would give his support.
At the Beppan office I listened to a discussion to decide on the location of the training units (Kyuikutai and Renseitai), and learned that Bogor had been decided on as the center for this training.
Then and there Mr. Yanagawa advised me to move to Bogor once they had found a house in that city for me and my family.
In the meantime I had been travelling back and forth between Tjiandjur and Bogor. But the fact is that until now no one at all has written about such an organization. There was the uprising led by the late Suprijadi, Dr. Ismangil, Muradi, Suparjono, Halir, Sunanto, Sudarmo, and others; but this occurred after the PETA had been formed and arose from developments within it rather than from some group operating outside. The same was true of the rebellions of PETA officers at Purwakarta, Dengklok, Segalaherang, Pegaden, and Pangkalan. This holds also for the organization supposedly established by the late Sutan Sjahrir, who is described in Bung Karno's auto biography as having made an agreement with the collaborating Indonesian leaders to set up an "underground movement." In my opinion this is doubtful.
I joined in organizing the
Sutan Sjahrir was not in the least willing to work with Indonesian government leaders any more than he was willing to work with the Japanese. He lived in extremely straitened circumstances.
Sometimes he put up at a friend's house at Kepuh, sometimes at Krukut, and once in a while he came to Tjiandjur or to Garut to Mr. Sastra's house. He had very strong objections to working with the Japanese, but does it fol low that he was therefore capable of carrying on underground activities other than airing his views? I never heard of any, even after we gained our freedom. Who undertook an underground movement at that time and how, nobody knows.
Hizbullah Troops
About the second half of 1944, when the rainy season had set in, a conference of leaders of the Djawa Hukukai from all over Java was held in the movie theater of the Zoological Gar den at Kebon Sirih. Via Mr. Raden Suradiredja, who at that time was the head of the economic bureau at the Bogor Shuchokan's office, I received an invitation to attend the meeting, which I accepted.
I had no idea what would be talked about at the conference, as I did not belong to the Board of the Djawa HSkcflcai. I was present only at the general meeting at Taman Kebon Sirih, and there I learned that the Djawa Hakcfcai intended to send a petition to the Saikosikikan, General Harada, asking that a conscriptive militia be introduced. Bung Karno, who made a fiery speech in support of Dai Nippon, ended by asking the audience to stand up if they agreed with the proposal.
I did not agree, so I remained in my seat. I felt that everyone's eyes were upon me, but I did not pay attention to it.
Finally a procession was formed, with Bung Karno at the head of the line, accompanied by Mr. Shimizu and carrying a let ter of petition. It began to rain. As time wore on, the rain grew heavier and heavier, and I was forced to seek shelter in front of the building, waiting for the downpour to stop so that I could go back to the house where I was spending the night with Mr. Suradiredja. Mr. Suradiredja had joined in the procession, which headed for the residence of General Harada, which is now Merdeka Palace.
The following day, Sidik Djojosukarto and Sudiro (who was usually called "Mbah") came to see me on behalf of Bung Karno and asked for a written explanation as to why I did not agree with the conscription proposal.
I immediately sat down to com pose a statement of my reasons.
In the letter I expressed my deep regret that Bung Karno had altered his earlier principles on conscription; he had changed and was no longer the same as in the time of the Indonesian Nationalist Party under the Dutch.
A few days later, back in Bogor, I met with Mr. Yanagawa at his home, located just opposite the PETA barracks (which had housed Battalion 14-in the time of the Dutch) , and I told him about the conscription proposal. At the end of our talk, which was witnessed by Lieutenant Yabe, it occurred to me that many Indonesian youths, especially those of the Islamic religious schools (pesantren and madrasah), were still hesitant about the Suishintai or Seinendan; if they could be mobilized by giving them training of their own, this might substitute for a conscrip ted militia.22 So I proposed, if they agreed, to form a force * 2 5 Several days after that session, the members of the Chuo Sangi-in were housed at the Daidan barracks in Petodjo for two days1 training. They were drilled in marching, taught how to use a rifle, and so on. Bung Karno and Bung Hatta also joined in this basic military training. Those who did not were Dr. Radjiman, Mr. Singgih, and several aged and sick persons.
Seinendan--Youth
Following the Chuo Sangi-in session I was called to the office of the Gunseikan, and there I learned that I would be included in a delegation of Chuo Sangi-in members who were to leave for Tokyo. The group was to be headed by Mr. Abdurachman Saleh and Mr. Masuda from the Study Committee, whose office was situated near the present KPM building.
In the end the delega tion did not go, as the journey to Japan had become more and more hazardous. Printing materials were first collected by Ibu Gatot and kept at Djalan Purwanggan 7 at the place of a maidservant named Ijem, from which they could easily be brought past the Dutch military outposts in Sentul and Kotagede to the hills.
Printing was done with the assistance of Harun, Miss Sri, and Miss Garmini (who is now a Lieutenant in the COWAD in Djakarta).32 In the first month we printed about 38,000 notes and in the second about 40,000. The money circulated as far as Tjirebon. We were able to get authoriza tion for printing the notes from Kasimo, the Minister of Economics for the Republic, who happened to have been brought in by the guerrilla army from the Magelang area.
When Colonel Nasution ordered the irregular troops to join or hand over their arms to the Indonesian National Army, I helped advise the irregulars to turn in their weapons to Lieutenant Darsono, who was under the command of Captain Suharto at that time.
I myself never met Captain Suharto, though we were both in Gunung Kidul. We received material support in this guerrilla period from Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono, who furnished us with paper to print the banknotes, and from Pangeran Honggowongso.
R. M. Darsono and Supardjo acted as our liaison with them. We also had contact with Pangeran Surjaningprang of the Pakualaman.
Indeed, his house became a headquarters for the guerrillas who slipped into Jogja city. This is the sum of my correction of Bung Karno's story as it was written down by Mrs. Cindy Adams. I should like to point out once again that I do not intend by this to sabotage Bung Karno, but only to show that history must not be distorted. I greatly regret that Bung Karno who, at the time his autobiography was written, still had authority and influence and was respected, could go so far as to tell things that were not true, only be cause he liked so much to boast. 
COWAD-Corps Wanita

